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Contractual Good Faith:
Variations on the Theme
of Expectations
by C. Scott Pryor

that "a party's good faith cooperation is an implied
condition precedent to performance of a contract."'
The duty
good faith
had a sporadic
in
andoflawyers
arehas
familiar
with the history
principle
Florida's common law tradition.2 Since 1965 it has also
been a statutorily implied term under the Uniform Commercial Code (Code). 3 Good faith (or the lack of it) has
been more frequently an issue in lender liability actions
than any other category of claims. 4 Nonetheless, astute
counsel must consider this duty as either an affirmative
defense or the basis of a claim in every contract action.
The concept of good faith is difficult to define apart from
a set of facts to which it can be applied. Similar to Justice
Potter Stewart's remark concerning pornography that "I
know it when I see it," most attorneys and judges have an
intuitive grasp of the parameters of good faith (or at least
those situations that evidence bad faith). Although the
Code defines good faith purely in subjective terms as "honesty in fact,"' several decisions under the common law have
adopted a broader definition.6 Recently, however, some
opinions by various district courts of appeal have by implication narrowed the outer limits of the duty of good
faith in both Code and common law contract cases.

Judges

The Early Days
An early discussion of obligations implied in a contract
can be found in Sharp v. Williams, 192 So. 476 (Fla. 1939),
in which the Florida Supreme Court affirmed a decision
that breach of an implied contractual duty constituted
actionable "bad faith." In Sharp a landlord sublet part of
the leased premises to a subtenant with a provision that
the sublease would be extended if the original lease were
renewed. Rather than extending the original lease, how20 THE FLORIDA BAR JOURNAL/JANUARY 1998

ever, the tenant/sublessor obtained a new lease and
thereby eliminated the sublessee's right to extension.
While the tenant's actions did not violate any provision of
the sublease, the court noted, "A contract includes not only
the things written, but also terms and matters which,
though not actually expressed, are implied by law, and
these are as binding as the terms which are actually writ7
ten or spoken."
These implied terms include, among others, the promise to do nothing that would prevent the other party from
creating or obtaining any benefit which could arise under
the contract. Thus, the subtenant's expectation of an extension was a sufficient basis on which to base a claim for
bad faith breach of contract.

The Uniform Commercial Code
Little came of the court's discussion of bad faith breaches
of contract over the next 30 years. With the adoption of
the Uniform Commercial Code in 1965, however, the duty
of good faith became explicit. F.S. §671.203 recites that
"[e]very contract or duty within this code imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance or enforcement."
The Code narrowly defines its obligation: "'Good faith'
means honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned."8 Did the drafters intend that good faith under
the Code prohibits only intentionally wrongful actions and
otherwise permits enforcement "to the letter of the contract"? While their original intent is unclear, it would appear that at least today a narrow understanding of good
faith under the Code is in order. In light of a series of
cases from various jurisdictions holding parties liable in
damages for breach of the Code's duty of good faith 9 the
Permanent Editorial Board issued an Official Commen-

tary in 1994 to the effect that
This section [UCC 1-203] does not support an independent cause of action for
failure to perform or enforce in good
faith. Rather, this section means that a
failure to perform or enforce, in good
faith, a specific duty or obligation under
the contract, constitutes a breach of that
contract or makes unavailable, under the
particular circumstances, a remedial
right or power. This distinction makes it
clear that the doctrine of good faith
merely directs a court toward interpreting contracts within the commercial context in which they are created, performed
and enforced, and does not create a separate duty of fairness and reasonableness
which can be independently breached. 10
Good faith under the Code is thus
more of an interpretive tool than an
independent remedial source.

Common Law Good Faith
The narrow, subjective interpretation of good faith has not carried the
day universally. In a non-Code case
the Third District Court of Appeal
expanded on the remedy afforded by
the Sharp decision and held that a
blanket lease provision prohibiting
assignment by the tenant could not
be enforced in an arbitrary or capricious manner. Fernandez v. Vazquez,
397 So. 2d 1171 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981).
The owners of a bakery leased it for
five years with a provision that the
lessee could not assign the lease or
sublet the premises without the
written consent of the landlord. The
tenants decided to get out of the bakery business and obtained a buyer
who agreed to take an assignment
of the lease. The landlord refused to
consent but a month later offered to

lease the premises to the prospective
buyer for an additional $250 per
month. The buyer rejected the offer
and the sale of the business fell
apart. The landlord immediately
commenced an action to terminate
the lease to which the tenants counterclaimed on the ground that it was
the landlord who had breached the
lease by refusing to consent to the
proposed assignment.
The trial court granted summary
judgment against the tenants but the
court of appeal reversed, holding that
"[a] withholding of consent to assign
a lease, which fails the tests for good
faith and commercial reasonableness, constitutes a breach of the lease
agreement."" Unlike the comment of
the Permanent Editorial Board, the
Third District concluded that breach
of the duty of good faith produced an
affirmative claim for relief and was
to be measured by objective criteria,
not the subjective state of mind of the

landlord. 12
In most circuits, the effect of the
Fernandez decision has largely been
limited to situations involving similar facts (i.e., assignments of commercial leases).' 3 The Third District extended the reach of Fernandez,
however, in L.V McClendon Kennels,
Inc. v. Investment Corp. of South
Florida,490 So. 2d 1374 (Fla. 3d DCA
1986), by applying it to a greyhound
booking contract. The contract between the kennel and the track was
silent about the kennel's right of assignment, but the court of appeal
read that silence as an authorization

to assign subject only to the track's
right to evaluate the proposed
assignee's qualifications and fitness. 14 The same court also applied
the broad notion of good faith in the
interpretation of a disputed provision
of an easement in Green Companies,
Inc. of Floridav. Kendall Racquetball
Investments, Ltd., 560 So. 2d 1208
(Fla. 3d DCA 1990)." Good faith under the common law can thus be an
independent source of a right or an
affirmative defense.

Code Decisions
Another line of cases, primarily
arising under the Code, has continued to apply the obligation of good
faith in narrower, subjective terms.
In one of the first lender liability
cases in Florida a borrower brought
an action against its bank for accelerating an installment note in bad
faith. Quest v. Barnett Bank of
Pensacola, 397 So. 2d 1020 (Fla. 1st
DCA 1981). Installment or term
notes 16 generally contain a provision
that allows the lender to accelerate
the obligation if the lender feels "insecure." The Code provides that a
lender may deem itself "insecure"
only if the lender "in good faith believes that the prospect of payment
or performance is impaired."" Of
particular importance is the Code's
allocation of the burden of proof of
lack of good faith to the borrower. 18
This burden was too much for the
borrower in Quest to overcome, especially where the evidence showed
that the borrower was overdrawn by
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$6,500 with two more drafts of
$6,000 and $14,000 due to be presented shortly. Unlike the common
law definition of good faith, the court
held that under the Code "the test
of good faith ... is a wholly subjective one of honesty."19
Quest's strongest argument to
overcome the high burden of establishing that the bank had not acted
in good faith was that a prior course
of conduct (i.e., payment of overdrafts) established a standard from
which the bank could not deviate
without prior notice. 20 Unfortunately
for Quest, the court in effect deemed
such notice to have been given in a
redocumented loan agreement executed after the most recent previous overdraft. In short, the terms of
the written agreement governed, not
some objective extra-contractual
principles.
Two subsequent cases reiterated
the sanctity of written contracts in
the face of challenges to a bank's
good faith under the Code. In Flagship Nat'l Bank v. Gray Distribution
Systems, Inc., 485 So. 2d 1336 (Fla.
3d DCA 1986), a borrower and its
guarantor both sued a bank for failing to extend additional credit after
having done so in the past. Unlike
the situation in Quest, Gray had not
executed new documents after previous additional extensions of credit.
Nonetheless, the appellate court reversed the trial court's decision that
the bank had violated its duty of
good faith. The note at issue in Flagship was a demand instrument that
is normally unencumbered by notions of good faith. In what could be
considered as dicta, the court considered F.S. §671.205 and held that
the express language of the contract
would prevail even over a prior inconsistent course of dealing:
[Wihen a course of dealings and the express terms of an agreement appear to
conflict, the practice of the parties and
the agreement must be construed, wherever reasonable, as consistent with each
other.... If no reasonable consistent construction can be drawn, the express
21
terms of the agreement control.
The next year the Second District
Court of Appeal weighed in with a
similar conclusion in Brighton Dev.
Corp. v. Barnett Bank, 513 So. 2d

1103 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987). Brighton
had paid a $171,000 commitment fee
to the bank but failed to complete
all the required loan documents by
the deadline specified in the commitment letter. The bank refused
Brighton's request for an extension
of time and kept the fee. Brighton
sued, arguing the bank's refusal constituted bad faith. The court of appeal affirmed the dismissal of
Brighton's complaint holding that
"the bad faith claim had no merit
since Barnett was under no contractual obligation to grant an extension
of time."22 Of course, neither the
landlord in Fernandeznor the track
owner in McClendon Kennels had
been under a contractual obligation
to consent to the requested assignments in their cases, either.
The application of a purely subjective measure of good faith and a corresponding emphasis on the written
contract terms in Code cases has
continued unabated. See, e.g., Riedel
v. NCNB Nat'l Bank of Florida,591
So. 2d 1038, 1040 (Fla. 1st DCA

1991) ("The UCC duty of good faith
may not be imposed to override the
express terms of a contract."); and
IndianHarborCitrus,Inc. v. Poppel,
658 So. 2d 605 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995)
("We hold that when the contract is
clear and unambiguous, the contract
terms may not be varied by resort to
those concepts [of good faith, custom
and usage or course of dealing].11)23
The Florida Code decisions track the
Official Commentary of the Permanent Editorial Board and eliminate
good faith as an independent basis
of a claim.

Two Standards or One?
The apparent bifurcation of the
nature and standards of the obligation of good faith under the common
law and the Code is not as contradictory as might first appear. F.S.
§671.103 provides that:
Unless displaced by the particular provisions of this code, the principles of law
and equity, including the law merchant
and the law relative to capacity to contract, principal and agent, estoppel,
fraud, misrepresentation, duress, coer-
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cion, mistake, bankruptcy, or other validating or invalidating causes shall
supplement its provisions.
The federal District Court for the
Northern District of Florida made
use of this section to allow a surety
to be subrogated to payments due
under a construction contract, notwithstanding its failure to perfect a
security interest under Article 9 of
the Code. McAtee v. United States
Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 401 F.
Supp. 11 (N.D. Fla. 1975). Courts in
other jurisdictions have specifically
grounded the propriety of importing
an expansive definition of the common law duty of good faith into a
24
Code case under this provision.
There is, thus, no inherent inconsistency between two lines of good faith
depending on the context of a case
(Code or non-Code).
What is making matters unclear,
however, are several federal and
state court decisions applying the
narrow Code understanding of good
faith in non-Code cases. These decisions are particularly puzzling because they fail to articulate any rationale for doing so. InEastBay Ltd.
Partnershipv. American GeneralLife
& Accident Insurance Co., 744 F.
Supp. 1118 (M.D. Fla. 1990), the
court granted summary judgment to
a lender who had refused to consent
to its borrower's sale of a shopping
center. The lender had concluded
that the prospective buyer lacked
sufficient management experience to
operate the mall. Such consideration
probably met the objective good faith
criteria of Fernandez and its progeny. Nonetheless, the court cited
Brighton, a Code decision, in support
of its conclusion.
More recently, the Florida Fourth
District Court of Appeal explicitly
relied on a series of Code cases to
reverse a decision of the trial court
in favor of a party to a non-Code contract. City of RivieraBeach v. John's
Towing, 691 So. 2d 519 (Fla. 4th DCA
1997). The court held that
"[a]lthough Indian Harbor was a
case decided under the Uniform
Commercial Code's implied obligation of good faith, we find no difference when the implied term attempts to vary the express terms of

a contract not under the UCC.'u 5
Nonetheless, there may be a unifying rationale under the common
law good faith cases after all. InFirst
Texas Savings Assoc. v. Comprop Investment Properties Ltd., 752 F.
Supp. 1568 (M.D. Fla. 1990), a construction lender sought to foreclose
a mortgage and to obtain a money
judgment on the underlying note as
well as personal guaranties. The
borrower and guarantors counterclaimed on several grounds including breach of duty of good faith.
Rather than simply applying the
appropriate rule, the district court
analyzed the purpose of the requirement of good faith and concluded
that
[I]n determining the nature and extent
of the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing between the parties, courts generally use a measure of the justifiable
expectations of the parties. As a result,
where one party acts arbitrarily, capriciously or unreasonably, that conduct
exceeds the justifiable expectations of
the second party and consequently, the
second party should be compensated for
its damages and/or excused from performance.26
Given the fact-based focus on the
parties' "justifiable expectations,"
the court denied the lender's motion
for summary judgment. The district
court inBurgerKing Corp. v. Weaver,
798 F. Supp. 684 (S.D. Fla. 1992),
applied the same reasoning to deny
Burger King's motion for summary
judgment on a counterclaim brought
by a franchisee for allowing another
restaurant to open in close proximity to it. The franchise agreement at
issue specifically negated any expectation of the franchisee that it had
acquired an "exclusive" territory.Yet
the court concluded that
[Tihe express denial of an exclusive territorial right to the franchisee "does not
necessarily imply a wholly different right
to Burger King- the right to open other
proximate franchises at will regardless
of their effect on the [defendant's] operations." . . . [A] franchisee is entitled to
expect that the franchisor "will not act
to destroy the right of the franchisee to
enjoy the fruits of the contract."27
Both the Code and common law doctrines of good faith focus on expectations. Their respective range of relevant expectations, however, differs
substantially. Under the Code, it is

24 THE FLORIDA BAR JOURNAL/JANUARY 1998

only those of the defending party. By
contrast, the common law looks at the
expectations of both parties.

Litigation Considerations
At least in non-Code cases, the
court must define the expectations
of the parties to the agreement. Of
first importance in this process of
definition is the contract itself. In
other words, the mutual intention of
the parties at the time of the original contract is of primary significance. Where a contract expressly
deals with an issue neither party
should be heard to complain of the
other's lack of good faith when enforcing with it. If the written agreement provides that the party alleged
to have breached the duty of good
faith can take a particular action, it
cannot be a breach of the duty of good
faith when it does so.
However, when the contract does
not deal explicitly with a particular
action, the court must look to the
agreement's overarching purpose to
determine if the act is consistent
with the expectations that would
normally accompany that purpose.
There is thus a breach of good faith
where the mutually anticipated result (whether express or implied) is
intentionally frustrated by the performance (or lack thereof) of the
other party. Each of the non-Code
decisions arguably falls within the
ambit of the "mutual expectations"
of the parties even though the opinions were not articulated in that
fashion. Instead of pronouncing certain bright line objective standards
of good faith, the courts could have
allowed each of the parties to develop evidence of their expectations
at the trial level. It would then be
up to the trier of fact to determine if
the aggrieved party's expectations
were indeed "mutual."
Summary judgment would still be
appropriate in cases in which the alleged breach of the duty of good faith
does not conflict with the purpose of
the contract. In cases in which the
evidence of the purpose of the contract is in conflict and a jury has
been empaneled, a special verdict
should be submitted to determine
the scope of the mutual expectations

of the parties at the time of contracting. If the jury concludes that the aggrieved party's expectations were
shared by the other party, then it
would go on to decide whether the
other party's actions violated the
duty of good faith.
The Code's definition of good faith
remains subjective. It is not the parties' mutual expectations that determine the scope of obligations to
which the duty of good faith applies.
Rather, it is only the terms of the
contract and the understanding of
the party alleged to have breached
to which the duty of good faith is relevant. Counsel for the aggrieved
party, therefore, has the more difficult burden to demonstrate an actionable understanding from the defending party's own testimony or
internal documents.
The contractual duty of good faith
remains of great significance in
Florida. While the bases for the duty
vary with whether the contract is
subject to the Code, counsel for either party must consider the existence of the duty and take steps to
ensure its factual development in
discovery and at trial.O

Fernandezv. Vazquez, 397 So. 2d 1171,
1174 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1981); see also
Champagne-Webber,Inc. v. City of Fort
Lauderdale, 519 So. 2d 696 (Fla. 4th
D.C.A. 1988).
1 See, e.g., the early discussion of "bad
faith" hinderance of performance in
Sharp v. Williams, 192 So. 476 (Fla.
1939).
3 FLA. STAT.

§671.203 (1995).

4 See, e.g,, Flagship National Bank v.
Gray DistributionSystems, Inc., 485 So.
2d 1336 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1986); and Quest
v. Barnett Bank of Pensacola,397 So. 2d
1020 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1981).

C. Scott Pryor is of counsel to the
commercial section of the Orlando law
firm of Zimmerman, Shuffield, Kiser &
Sutcliffe, PA. Before relocating to Orlando, he practiced for over 12 years in
Milwaukee, Wisconsin, where he concentrated in the areas of commercial transactions, asset-based lending, creditors'
rights,and bankruptcylitigation.He previously published an articleentitled "Tension Between the Trustee and the 7the"
in the May 1996 edition of the American
Bankruptcy Institute Journal.

I FLA. STAT. §671.210(19) (1995). This article specifically excludes consideration
of a merchant's obligation of good faith
under Article 2 of the Code (FLA. STAT.
§672.103(1)(b)) or the good faith required
of a holder in due course under Article 3
(FLA. STAT. §673.1031(1)(d)).
6 Fernandez, 397 So. 2d at 1173-74.
1 Sharp, 192 So. 480; see also Department of Insurance v. Teachers Insurance
Co., 404 So. 2d 735 (Fla. 1981).
FLA. STAT. §671.201(19).
See, e.g., Duffield v. First Interstate
Bank of Denver, N.A., 13 F.3d 1403 (10th
Cir. 1993); Conoco, Inc. v. Inman Oil Co.,
774 F.2d 895 (8th Cir. 1985); Reid v. Key
Bank of Southern Maine, 821 F.2d 9 (1st
Cir. 1987); and FirstNat'l Bank in Libby
v. Twvombly, 689 P.2d 1226 (Mont. 1984).
1oPerm. Ed. Bd., Commentary no. 10,
1-203 (Feb. 10, 1994).
L1Fernandez, 397 So. 2d at 1174.
12 In the case of commercial leases, those
criteria include the "(a) financial responsibility of the proposed subtenant, (b) the
'identity' or 'business character' of the
subtenant, i.e., suitability for the particular building, (c) the need for alteration of
the premises, (d) the legality of the proposed use, and (e) the nature of the occupancy, i.e., office, factory, clinic, etc." Id.
13 See, e.g., Petrou v. Wilder, 557 So. 2d
617 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1990); Ludal Dev.
Co. v. Farm Stores, Inc., 458 So. 2d 781
(Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1984).
14 "Its refusal may not be arbitrary and
unreasonable." McClendon, 490 So. 2d at

1377 (citing Fernandez). In McClendon
the track owner undercut whatever subjective good faith it may have claimed by
entering into a separate booking contract
with the proposed assignees after they
had purchased another kennel.
11The Green case is also significant because it cites §205 of the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts which contains a
very expansive definition of good faith.
560 So. 2d at 1210. Accord, FirstNationwide Bank v. FloridaSoftware Services,
Inc., 770 F. Supp. 1537 (M.D. Fla. 1991)
(applying Fernandez rationale to assignment of computer software licensing
agreement).
16 Demand notes, however, may be called
at any time "with or without reason."
Quest, 397 So. 2d at 1021.
17 FYA. STAT. §671.208 (emphasis added).
18 Id.

19 Quest, 397 So. 2d at 1022 (quoting
Farmers Co-Op Elevator, Inc. v. State
Bank, 236 N.W.2d 674, 678 (Iowa 1975)).
20 FLA. STAT. §671.205(1).
21 Flagship,485 So. 2d at 1340.
22 Brighton, 513 So. 2d at 1104.
23 See also Crawford v. Goldkist, Inc.,
614 F. Supp. 682 (M.D. Fla. 1985).
24 See, e.g., UnitedStates National
Bank
of Oregon v. Boge, 102 Or.App. 262 (1990).
25 City of Riviera Beach, 691 So. 2d at
521.
26First Texas, 753 F. Supp. 1574.
27 Burger King, 798 F. Supp. 689 (quoting Scheck v. Burger King Corp., 756 F.
Supp. 543, 549 (S.D. Fla. 1991)).
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